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  Genocide in China: Uighur Re-education Camps and 
International Response 
By: Julia Stern1 
 
Uighurs in the autonomous region of Xinjiang, China, have 
long faced discrimination at the hands of the Chinese Communist 
Party (“CCP”).2 At the time of this writing, over the past five 
years, the oppression of Uighurs and other Muslim minorities has 
escalated to crimes against humanity and genocide.3 Despite 
ongoing international pressure and sanctions to end these human 
rights violations, the situation in Xinjiang continues to worsen, 
evidenced by new information leaked or reported by former 
detainees.4 China has also begun exerting its international power to 
pressure foreign countries to report Uighurs and has warned other 
countries against attending the United Nations Human Rights 
Council side panel on Uighur rights.5 To date, the Chinese 
government has concealed the exact number of Uighurs detained in 
Xinjiang “re-education” camps and their treatment within these 
camps.6   
 
1 Associate Member, (2020-2021), Immigration and& Human Rights Law 
Review, University of Cincinnati. 
2 U.S. House, Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and 
Oversight, The Uighurs: A History of Persecution (H.R. 111-28, 2009).  
3 Canadian Parliament, Statement by the Subcommittee on International Human 
Rights Concerning the human rights situation of Uyghurs and other Turkic 
Muslims in Xinjiang, China (Oct. 21, 2020), 
https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/43-2/SDIR/news-
release/10903199.  
4 Eli Meixler, 'I Begged Them to Kill Me.' Uighur Woman Tells Congress of 
Torture in Chinese Internment Camps, (Nov. 29, 2018), 
https://time.com/5467628/china-uighur-congress-torture/. 
5 Agence France-Presse, UN diplomats and activists describe Chinese pressure 
and ‘threats’ over Uygur event at UN rights council, (Apr. 2, 2019), 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3004214/un-diplomats-
and-activists-describe-chinese-pressure-and. 
6 Wen Lii, Taiwan Voices Support for Uyghurs in China The human rights crisis 
in Xinjiang foreshadows Taiwan’s future under PRC control, and the island 
knows it. (May 2, 2019), https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/taiwan-voices-
support-for-uyghurs-in-china/.  
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This article will outline the historical relationship between the 
CCP and Uighur Muslims. As well as analyze the relationship 
between the CCP and international community to ascertain 
whether the CCP is committing genocide and, if genocide is 




To understand the legal and political situation surrounding 
the Uighur “re-education camps,” it is critical to first understand 
the history between Uighurs and the current Chinese Communist 
Party (“CCP”). The Uighurs (also spelled Uyghur or Uygur) are a 
Turkic-speaking, Muslim minority group located in the 
Autonomous Region of Xinjiang, China.7 Xinjiang is culturally, 
linguistically, and historically part of a Turkic civilization distinct 
from the civilization that developed in China.8  
The colonization of Xinjiang occurred following a fifteen-
year revolt by Turkic Muslims against Han Chinese occupiers.9 
Colonizing Xinjiang allowed for the alleviation of population 
pressures and brought new economic opportunities to mainland 
China.10 Once settled in the region, China created policies of both 
assimilation and destruction (of historical beliefs, practices, 
language, etc.).11 Historically, China has participated in 
assimilation tactics that strengthen nationalism. One of China’s 
assimilation tactics occurred during and after the Cultural 
Revolution, when China forbade ethnic minorities from using their 
 
7 Congressional Research Service, Uyghurs in China, (Jan. 4, 2021).  
8 Eric Hyer, China’s Policy towards Uighur Nationalism, 26 No. 1,80, Journal 
of Muslim Minority Affairs, (2006). 
9 Felix K. Chang, China's Central Asian Power and Problems (1997). 
10 Id.  
11 Ethnic Relations in Contemporary China, Pol. and Soc., 85-108 (Vol. 25, 
2006). 
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native languages and suppressed traditional customs and 
practices.12 
Xinjiang is known as an internal colony.13 All non-Han 
groups of people were placed in an ethnopolitical category known 
as “minority nationalities” or shaoshu minzu.14,15 This grouping 
makes it appear as if the conquered country has always been a part 
of China and “erases the difference between those who built their 
own states or empires in the past, which could easily fulfill the 
criteria for being recognized as independent states with their own 
seat in the United Nations.”16 The concept that people in these 
colonized regions have an ancient history of being “Chinese 
people” is utilized to claim unity within the country and justify 
nationalist “re-education” and internment of Uighurs.17 
It is important to note that western concepts of nationality 
and minority oppression do not necessarily apply to Chinese 
society. China has a complex composition of Chinese minority 
groups and a fusion of people creating a difference in the 
understanding of nationality and legal equality.18 Uighurs have 
 
12 Michael Dillon, Religious Minorities and China, Minority Rights Group 
International (2001). 
13 Barry Sautman, Is Xinjiang an Internal Colony?, Jstor, 239-271 (Vol. 2, No. 
2, 2000). 
14 Jin Binggao, When Does The Word 'Minority Nationality' [Shaoshu Minzu] 
[First] Appear in Our Country? (1987). 
15 Han dynasty, Briticana (last visited Fed. 6, 2021) the Han dynasty establish 
what was considered Chinese culture. “Han” became the Chinese word denoting 
someone who is ethnically Chinese. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Han-
dynasty 
16 Id. at 524. 
17 James Leibold, Despite China’s denials, its treatment of the Uyghurs should 
be called what it is: cultural genocide, The Conversation (July 24, 2019), 
https://theconversation.com/despite-chinas-denials-its-treatment-of-the-uyghurs-
should-be-called-what-it-is-cultural-genocide-120654. 
18 Rong Ma, Ethnic Relations in Contemporary China: Cultural Tradition and 
Ethnic Policies since 1949, 25:1 Policy and Society 85 (2006). 
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never fully assimilated into Chinese culture in the same way that 
many other minority nationalities in China have.19 
According to the Council on Foreign Relations Report, the 
religious activities of Uighur Muslims are tightly controlled by 
government authorities, while Muslims in the rest of the country 
enjoy greater religious freedom.20 Article 36 of the People’s 
Republic of China’s constitution guarantees citizens “freedom of 
religious belief” and the protection of “normal religious 
activities.”21 Article 36 prohibits “making use of religion to engage 
in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens, 
or interfere with the educational system of the State,” and provides 
that “[r]eligious bodies and religious affairs are not subject to any 
foreign domination.”22 Despite the freedoms Article 36 provides, 
the undefined terminology makes it ambiguous whether “China’s 
constitution protects the same range of belief that is recognized 
under international law.”23  
The religious control and treatment of Uighurs began to 
worsen in 1955 when Xinjiang was designated as an autonomous      
region instead of a province.24 Due in part to the rich natural 
resources and economic potential in the region, an increased 
 
19 Human Rights Watch, Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in 
Xinjiang, 10-13 (Vol. 17, Apr. 2005). 
20 Eleanor Albert, Religion in China, Council on Foreign Relations (Mar. 15, 
2018). 
21 China: Religion and Chinese Law, The Law Library of Congress, Global 
Legal Research Center (June 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1068681/download. 
22 XIANFA art. 36 (1982, as amended in 1988, 1993, 1999, and 2004), the State 
Council of the People’s Republic of China, 
http://english.gov.cn/archive/laws_regulations/2014/08/23/content_281474982 
987458.htm. 
23 Congressional-Executive Commission on China, U.S. Government Publishing 
Office (Oct. 5, 2017), 
https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/2017%20Annual%
20Report%20_2.pdf. 
24 Preeti Bhattacharji, Uighurs and China’s Xinjiang Region, Coun. For. Rel. 
(May 29, 2012). 
5 
number of Han Chinese moved to Xinjiang.25 As of December 
20th, 2020 the Han Chinese form two-fifths of Xinjiang’s total 
population.26 Human rights watchdog organizations have 
documented that the economic benefits of resource extraction and 
development disproportionately benefit Han Chinese citizens while 
the Uighur people face increasing marginalization.27 
The economic and geopolitical value of Xinjiang has 
contributed to tensions between ethnic groups in the region.28 
Xinjiang is China’s largest base for cotton, lavender, and hops as 
well as a major area for sheep and cattle.29 In 2012, Xinjiang’s 
agriculture sector accounted for 17.6% of China’s gross domestic 
product.30 Xinjiang is also rich in mineral deposits, holding the 
largest reserves of oil, natural gas, and coal in the country.31 When 
China colonized Xinjiang, leaders sought to control space, 
resources, and people by occupying land as well as establishing 
exclusionary property and coercive labor systems.32 Due to this, 
economic disparities between Han Chinese and Uighurs have 
grown consistently since the 1980s.33 Uighurs looking for jobs 
often face discrimination from employers who favor Han 
Chinese.34 Additionally, Chinese economic policies encouraging 
 
25 Hsieh & Falkenheim, Supra note 2. 
26 Amy Liu & Kevin Peters, The Hanification of Xinjiang, China: The Economic 
Effects of the Great Leap West, Stud. in Eth. and Nationalism, 267-270 (Vol. 17, 
2017). 
27 Anthony Howell & C. Cindy Fan, Migration and Inequality in Xinjiang: 
A Survey of Han and Uyghur Migrants in Urumqi, 52:1 Eurasian Geo. & Econ., 
119 (2011). 
28 Lui & Peters, Supra note 25 at 269-70 
29 Hong Kong Trade Development Council 2017 
30 Id. 
31 Lui & Peters, Supra note 25 
32 Evelyn Nakano Glenn, Settler Colonialism as Structure: A Framework for 
Comparative Studies of U.S. Race and Gender Formation (American 
Sociological Association, 2015). 
33 Supra note 20. 
34 Id. 
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immigration into Xinjiang have created a limited job market and 
prompted a population boom in the area.35 
In 1997, Uighurs peacefully protested their treatment, 
demanding equality, religious freedom, and political autonomy.36 
In response, China initiated its “Strike Hard Campaign,”37 sending 
armed police to dismantle the protests.38 What resulted became 
known as the Ghulja Massacre.39 Reports vary, but Chinese 
officials claim nine people were killed and nearly 200 were injured 
during the riots.40 Uighur sources in Kazakhstan claim as many as 
100 died.41  
The aftermath of the protests marked a shift in Chinese 
policies towards Uighur separatists.42 Chinese authorities executed 
leaders and jailed an estimated twenty-seven people for their roles 
in the unrest.43 According to foreign nationals, by the end of the 
year, the Chinese military had killed closer to 200 Uighur 
nationalists and had arrested more than 2,000.44 In retaliation to 
China’s response, separatists planted bombs in Yining and Urumqi, 
 
35 Id. 
36 Dana Carver Boehm, China's Failed War on Terror: Fanning the Flames of 
Uighur Separatist Violence, 2 Berkeley J. Middle E. & Islamic L. 61 (2009). 
37 Human Rights Watch, Anti-Crime Campaigns and Religious Repression. 
(2005) “Strike Hard” is a term used to refer to anti-crime campaigns that mass 
arrest alleged criminals. These campaigns commonly result in the unlawful 
arrest and sometimes the wrongful execution of large numbers of people. 
According to Amnesty International, over 200 death sentences were recorded in 
Xinjiang because of such campaigns between 1997 and 2003. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Why is there tension between China and the Uighurs?, BBC news (Sept. 24, 
2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-26414014. 
41 Hyer, supra note 3. 
42 Boehm, Supra note 34 at 64 
43 Murray Scot Tanner & James Bellacqua, China’s Response to Terrorism, 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (June 2016). 
44 Fergus Shiel & Sasha Chavkin, China Cables: Who Are the Uighurs and Why 
Mass Detention?, Intern. Consortium of Inves. J. (Nov. 24, 2019). See also: Uni. 
Of Central Arkansas, China/Uighurs (1949-present).  
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killing several people.45 China executed eight people for 
involvement in the bombings.46 
 Tensions came to a head during the Urumqi Protests in 
2009.47 After peaceful protestors ignored orders to disperse, 
Chinese police used force (fire hoses and batons) to break up the 
crowd.48 The protestors fought back, and over 150 people 
(including both Han and Uighurs) were killed.49 By July 8, 2009, 
police and army forces poured into cities across the region to 
enforce informal martial law.50  
 Violence continued between Uighurs and the Chinese 
government when, in 2012, six Uighurs reportedly tried to hijack a 
plane from Hotan to Urumqi.51 Twenty-seven people died after 
police opened fire on (what state media described as) a mob armed 
with knives attacking government buildings.52 In 2014, an 
estimated thirty-one people were killed with ninety more 
sustaining injuries when terrorists detonated a series of explosives 
at an Urumqi market.53 The Urumqi attacks marked a shift in 
governmental treatment of Uighurs, who were blamed for the 
 
45 Patrick E. Tyler, In China's Far West, Tensions With Ethnic Muslims Boil 




47 Tania Branigan, Ethnic Violence in China leaves 140 dead, The Guadrian 
(July 6, 2009), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jul/06/china-riots-
uighur-xinjiang.  
48 Edward Wong, Riots in Western China Amid Ethnic Tension, N.Y. Times, 
(Jul. 5, 2009). https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/06/world/asia/06china.html 
49 Stanley W. Toops, Understanding the Disturbances in Xinjiang, E-
International Relations (July 9, 2009), https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/1818. 
50 Id. After the protests, police and army forces were mass sent to Urumqi to 
control the region. Although martial law was never declared the crackdown 
served to act as an equivalent state of security. 
51 Why is there tension between China and the Uighurs?, BBC News (Sept. 26, 
2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-26414014. 
52 Id. 
53 Mary Tanner & James Bellacqua, China’s Response to Terrorism, U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission (June 2016). 
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incident.54 This lead to increased unrest in the region throughout 
2014.55 In response, China launched its "year-long campaign to 
end terrorism.”56 A strategy based on three pillars: (1) enhanced 
regional economic growth, (2) stronger internal security 
capabilities; and (3) deepened control over ethnic and religious 
activities.57 Ultimately, this campaign led to the current “re-
education” centers.58  
 It is unclear how accurate the reporting on these violent 
incidents has been. The Chinese state media is heavily regulated 
and reports from people present at the incidents can differ from the 
official accounts.59 Although Uighur separatists were blamed for 
the violence, independent sources have been unable to obtain 
definitive evidence as to the identities of those responsible for the 
 
54 Id. 
55 Emily Rauhala, China Now Says Almost 100 Were Killed in Xinjiang 
Violence, Time (Aug. 4, 2014).  
56 Supra note 49 
57 Supra note 51 
58 Id (“[A]cts of violence that Chinese officials and state media have labeled as 
terrorism do not meet the definitions of the term that are widely accepted outside 
of China. Concurrently, other cases of violent crimes that observers would 
describe as terrorism using these definitions are sometimes not described as 
terrorism by Chinese authorities.”). 
59 Beina Xu & Eleanor Albert, Council on Foreign Relations, Media Censorship 
in China, (updated Fed. 17, 2017) (“China has one of the world’s most 
restrictive media environments, relying on censorship to control information in 
the news, online, and on social media. Censorship guidelines are circulated 
weekly from the Communist Party’s propaganda department and the 
government’s Bureau of Internet Affairs to prominent editors and media 
providers. The government is particularly keen on blocking reports of issues that 
could incite social unrest, like official corruption, the economy, health and 
environmental scandals, certain religious groups, and ethnic strife.”). 
9 
attacks.60 The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (“ETIM”), a 
militant group, have also been blamed for the violent incidents.61  
Despite the severity of the bombing incidents, the violence 
Uighurs are known to have committed does not constitute a 
western definition of terrorism. The United States defines acts of 
terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence 
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or 
clandestine agents.”62 Xinjiang has only sporadically erupted into 
violence and the violence has historically been directed at Chinese 
power structures and agents (e.g., police stations, government 
buildings)—not civilians.63 Many of the incidents of violence 
stemmed from peaceful public protests, only occasionally 
organized by separatists, that turned violent following aggressive 




a. Uighurs and China’s “Re-education Centers” 
Since 2014, China has increasingly focused on security 
measures in Xinjiang. In Uighur-dominated areas government 
cameras, checkpoints, and police patrols were initiated.65 Mass 
arrests and sentencings were carried out for several "terror 
groups.”66 The Chinese state media published lists of people 
convicted of alleged extremist activity and sentenced them to 
 
60  Sui-Lee Wee, Chinese police blame separatist group for Urumqi bombing: 
Xinhua, Reuters News (May 18, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
china-xinjiang/chinese-police-blame-separatist-group-for-urumqi-bombing-
xinhua-idUSBREA4H01O20140518 
61 Beina Xu, Holly Fletcher & Jayshree Bajoria, The East Turkestan Islamic 
Movement (ETIM), Council on Foreign Relations (last updated Sept. 4, 2014), 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/east-turkestan-islamic-movement-etim.  
62 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (Jan. 3, 2007). 
63 Boehm, supra note 34. 
64 Id. 
65 Philip Wen, Terror threats transform China's Uighur heartland into security 
state, Reuters (Mar. 30, 2017). 
66 Toops, supra note 47. 
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death.67 The first reports of the mass detainment of Uighurs in 
"vocational schools" and "re-education" centers began in 2014.68 
The majority of Uighurs detained in the camps are held without 
being formally charged or an explanation as to why they have been 
detained.69 It is common practice for the camps to hold prisoners 
indefinitely.70 
In 2016, China began large-scale mosque destructions 
under the “mosque rectification” program.71 In 2017, China 
revised its Regulations on Religious Affairs, stating, “the 
management of religious affairs should adhere to the principles of 
protecting legitimate religious activities, curbing and preventing 
illegal and extreme practices, resisting infiltration, and fighting 
crime.”72 Another article prohibited individuals and organizations 
from creating conflict between religious and non-religious citizens 
and “from using religion to undermine ethnic unity, divide the 
nation, or carry out terrorist activities.”73 These regulations 
substantially limit the freedom to practice religion within China 
and prevents the education or practice of religion without special 
permission.74  
According to a 2009 Congressional-Executive Commission 
on China (“CECC”) report, Chinese officials often deny the 
registration applications of religious groups that are not affiliated 
with one of the officially recognized patriotic religious 
 
67 Tyler, supra 24. 
68 UHRP REPORT: The Mass Internment of Uyghurs: “We want to be respected 
as humans. Is it too much to ask?”, Uyghur Human Rights Project(Aug. 23, 
2018), https://uhrp.org/press-release/mass-internment-uyghurs-“we-want-be-
respected-humans-it-too-much-ask”.html.  
69 Lindsay Maizland, China’s Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang, Council on 
Foreign Relations (June 30, 2020). 
70 Id. 
71UHRP REPORT: Demolishing Faith: The destruction and Desecration of 
Uyghur Mosques and Shrines, Uyghur Human Right Project (Oct. 28, 2019), 
https://uhrp.org/press-release/demolishing-faith-destruction-and-desecration-
uyghur-mosques-and-shrines.html.  
72 Religious Affairs Regulations, 2 ¶1, (2017). 
73 Id. at art. 4. 
74 Id. at art. 9. 
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associations.75 For the religious minority of Uighurs, the 
regulations strictly control their lives.76 For example, in 2008 the 
state prevented fasting during Ramadan.77 Additionally, 
individuals have been arrested for getting up before dawn to eat—
an imperative practice to ensuring Muslims stay nourished while 
observing Ramadan—schools and institutions forced all students to 
eat during fasting hours, and Muslim-owned restaurants were 
required to remain open during Ramadan.78 China also limits and 
controls participation in Haj, the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca, 
which is one of the five tenets of the Islamic faith, through 
passport management.79 Uighurs who do get passports have to 
pledge they will not go on the Haj.80 Furthermore, those who apply 
for passports must provide fingerprints, voiceprints, and DNA 
samples for analysis.81   
  A CCP internal security report concluded that the Uighur 
independence movement in Xinjiang is the main threat to China’s 
stability.82 An estimated one million troops are stationed in 
Xinjiang; with no immediate external threat, troops are seemingly 
positioned to control ethnic unrest and guard re-education 
centers.83 
 
75 Toops, supra note 47. 
76 The Uighurs: A History of Persecution, Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight, 111 Cong. 28 (2009). 




79 Toops, supra note 47. See also: The Embassy of Kingd. Of Saudi Arabia, The 
Five Pillars Of Islam (last visited Jan. 14, 2021), 
https://www.saudiembassy.net/five-pillars-islam. 
80 Toops, supra note 47. 
81 Kate Fitz Gibbon, A Culture Destroyed: China Expunges Uyghur Identity, 
Cultural Property News (Aug. 27, 2018), https://culturalpropertynews.org/a-
culture-destroyed-china-expunges-uyghur-identity/.  
82 Tanner & Bellacqua, Supra note 41 at 12 
83 Up to one million detained in China’s Mass “re-education” Drive, Amnesty 
International, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/09/china-up-to-one-
million-detained/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2020). 
12 
b. Escalating Human Rights Violations 
Leaked government documents emphasize the breadth of 
tactics employed to control and isolate the Uighurs.84 During the 
Urumqi protests, Chen Quanguo, the current Communist Party 
Secretary of Xinjiang, told thousands of police to prepare for a 
“smashing, obliterating offensive.”85 He and his leadership team 
planned to detain Uighurs in large numbers, issuing a sweeping 
order to “round up everyone who should be rounded up.”86 This 
phrase appears repeatedly in internal documents.87 Authorities 
were told to look for specific behaviors like wearing long beards, 
giving up smoking or drinking, studying Arabic, and praying at 
mosques—behavior common among devout Uighur Muslims—as 
indicators of a potential detainee.88 
The leaked documents further told authorities to refer to the 
detention centers publicly as “job training facilities” and to portray 
them as relatively mild methods to address the problem of Islamic 
“extremism.”"89 Chinese officials referred to Uighurs as people 
“infected” by the “virus” of Islamic radicalism that “must be 
quarantined and cured.”     90 Further, the government referred to 
the systematic detention of Uighurs as “ying shou jin shou,” a 
phrase typically used to demand officials be vigilant and 
comprehensive in collecting taxes; applied  in this way, the phrase 
is dehumanizing to Uighurs.91 Notably, the directives made no 
mention of judicial procedures for people being detained.92 
 
84 Austin Ramzy & Chris Buckley, The Xinjiang Papers: Absolutely No mercy’: 
Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims, N.Y. 












Officials who failed to carry out the crackdown or did so 
slowly were punished and jailed.93 Uighur officials were accused 
of protecting and shielding their fellow Uighurs.94 Information on 
surveillance in Xinjiang showed the system flagged over one 
million people as potential threats simply for having a data sharing 
app on their phones.95 Authorities ordered the individual 
investigation of 40,557 flagged people and stated that "if it is not 
possible to eliminate suspicion" they should be sent for 
"concentrated training."96 
China consistently denies the internment of any Uighurs, 
instead claiming the facilities Uighurs are detained in are 
“vocational training centers” that emphasize “rehabilitation and 
redemption” and are part of efforts to combat terrorism and 
religious extremism.97 A forensic analysis of satellite images of 39 
of these facilities shows they are rapidly expanding.98 Between 
April 2017 and August 2018, the facilities tripled in size, covering 
an estimated one million square meters, roughly the size of 140 
soccer fields.99 The construction of new facilities and expansion of 
existing facilities largely began around April 2017, one month 
before Beijing enforced new anti-extremism regulations in 





95 Scilla Alecci, How China Targets Uighurs ‘One by One’ for Using a Mobile 
App, International Consortium of Invest. Journ. (Nov. 24, 2019), 
https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/how-china-targets-uighurs-one-
by-one-for-using-a-mobile-app/. 
96 Data leak reveals how China 'brainwashes' Uighurs in prison camps, BBC 
News (Nov. 24, 2019) https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-50511063.  
97 Philip Wen & Olzhas Auyezov, Tracking China’s Muslim Gulag, Reuters 







Notices posted to local government websites provide 
insight into the features of eighty of these camps. Documents 
include references to guardhouses, surveillance systems that leave 
“no blind spots,” automatic weapons and their safe storage, 
telecommunication “control systems” to monitor the content of 
“trainee” telephone conversations, and the forcible interruption of 
detainee phone calls.102 Recently, the government has stopped 
publishing the notices and began deleting the old ones from the 
internet.103 
Chen also called for the installation of technology-
enhanced surveillance across Xinjiang.104 Tens of thousands of 
security personnel were recruited to staff police stations and 
checkpoints.105 Scanners equipped with facial recognition cameras 
have been installed in public places such as mosques, hotels, and 
transportation hubs.106 
Within the detention centers, every aspect of a detainee’s 
life is monitored.107 According to leaked documents, detainees are 
assigned a fixed bed position, fixed queue position, fixed 
classroom seat, and fixed station during skills work.108 The 
documents also dictate how guards are to interact with detainees, 
by “implement[ing] behavioral norms and discipline requirements 
for getting up, roll call, washing, going to the toilet, organizing and 
housekeeping, eating, studying, sleeping, closing the door and so 
forth."109 Most disturbingly, the memo orders guards to “never 
allow escape, increase discipline and punishment of behavioral 
violations, promote confession, and [ensure] full video surveillance 




104 Ramzy & Buckel, supra note 89 
105 Id. See also: Chris Buckley & Paul Mozur, How China Uses High-Tech 
Surveillance to Subdue Minorities, N.Y. Times (May 22, 2019). 
106 Wen & Auyezov, supra note 48. 
107 Supra note 101 
108 Supra note 56. 
109 Supra note 45. 
110 Id. 
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The leaked documents also include explicit directives to 
arrest Uighurs with foreign citizenship and to track Uighurs living 
abroad.111 The document suggests, although does not outright 
state, that China's embassies and consulates are involved in the 
global search for Uighurs.112 
Since Chen Quanguo’s orders in 2017, mass detainments of 
Uighur Muslims have skyrocketed.113 Between 800,000 to 2 
million. Uighurs have been detained and sent to the “re-education” 
camps.114 Authorities often refuse to issue information to 
relatives–especially to those living abroad–on the whereabouts of 
family members.115 Overall, information on what happens in the 
camps is limited, but detainees who have fled China describe 
oppressive conditions. 
Previous detaineesFormer detainees recounting their 
experiences have said they were subjected to political 
indoctrination including being forced to: pledge loyalty to China, 
renounce Islam, recite communist party policies, recite Chinese 
laws, sing the Chinese national anthem, and learn Mandarin. 
People who fail to correctly memorize dictums are denied food.116 
Further, detainees were forced to engage in self-criticism sessions 
and report on fellow detainees, relatives, and neighbors.117  
Some detainees have reported prison-like conditions, with 
cameras and microphones monitoring their every move and 
remark.118      Others recall instances of torture, including sleep 
 
111 Supra note 57. 
112 Id. 
113 Chris Buckely, The Leaders Who Unleashed China’s Mass Detention of 
Muslims, N.Y. Times (Oct. 13, 2018). 
114 Lindsay Maizland, China’s Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang, Council on 
Foreign Relations (last updated June 30, 2020) 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uighurs-xinjiang.  
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deprivation, interrogations, sexual abuse, forced abortions, and 
forced contraception.119  
It is common knowledge that detention also disrupts and 
displaces families. Children whose parents have been sent to the 
camps are often forced to stay in state-run orphanages.120 Uighur 
parents living outside of China have to choose between returning 
home to be with their children, thereby risking detention, or 
staying abroad, separated from their children and unable to contact 
them.121 Foreign reporters who attempt to investigate the region 
are closely followed by Chinese security forces.122 Police have also 
placed temporary roadblocks to block reporters from reaching the 
camps.123 
c. International Response, Asylum, and Refugees 
International response to Uighur detainments has been slow 
and limited. Although China does not sign on nor participate in 
many of the UN agreements, China still holds sway on the 
international field with influence over much of the world's trade 
and manufacturing.124  
Uighurs attempting to flee Xinjiang face foreign 
immigration systems and difficulty obtaining visa documentation. 
At the height of detainments, Executive Order 13780 (“the travel 
ban”) was issued, severely impacting Muslim refugees and asylum 
seekers.125 Executive order 13780  cut the refugee program in half, 
capping it at 50,000 people.126 Now, new asylum policies have 
fundamentally changed the definition of persecution under the law 
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making the claim extremely difficult to meet.127 Further, persistent 
prejudices surrounding Muslims have greatly impacted refugee and 
asylum claims worldwide (most notably in western countries).128 
Uighurs have also tried to seek asylum in over fifty different 
countries including Turkey, Burma, and Laos.129  
Even after fleeing, Uighurs face the risk of deportation and 
harassment at the hands of CCP officials.130 Over four hundred 
Uighurs have experienced intrusive surveillance, scare tactics like 
death threats, intimidating phone calls and having their family 
members in China targeted to suppress their activities abroad.131 
Often harassment and threats are targeted at Uighur activists or 
former detainees who openly share their experiences.132 
The Chinese government relentlessly pursues Uighurs and 
uses its influence to pressure host countries into returning Uighur 
refugees and asylum seekers.133 In 2015, Thailand detained around 
fifty Uighurs and returned nearly one hundred to China.134 In 2017, 
Egyptian authorities rounded up hundreds of Uighurs, including 
students, and deported them back to China.135 Most are thought to 
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have ended up in Xinjiang internment camps.136 Once returned to 
China, Uighurs often disappear or are subjected to arbitrary 
detention, torture, and other serious human rights violations.137 
In the past 20 years, over 300 confirmed Uighurs have been 
forcibly returned to China from 16 different countries.138 These 
numbers do not include the Uighurs who were secretly returned to 
China by neighboring states.139 These individuals are often 
students, refugees, and asylum seekers.140 
Other foreign governments like Malaysia or Sweden have 
resisted Chinese pressure and refused to deport or return Uighur 
individuals to China.141 Instead, these countries consider Uighur 
asylum claims or allow Uighurs to travel onwards to safe 
destinations.142 Sweden and Germany’s governments have enacted 
policies to halt all deportations of Uighurs from their respective 
countries until further notice.143 Three resolutions from the 
European Parliament called on EU member states to refrain from 
returning Uighurs to China.144 
In 2019, most western countries signed a letter to the UN 
human rights chief condemning China’s actions.145 In response the 
UN chief demanded access to the camps.146 The European Union 
has called on China to respect religious freedom and change its 
policies in Xinjiang.147 In 2019, Turkey became the only Muslim-
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majority country to voice concern when its foreign minister called 
on China to ensure “the full protection of the cultural identities of 
the Uighurs and other Muslims” during a UN Human Rights 
Council session.148   
Many Muslim countries with close ties to China have 
remained notably silent, seemingly prioritizing economic ties and 
strategic relationships with China.149 In July 2019, more than three 
dozen states, including Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, signed a      
letter praising China’s “remarkable achievements” in human rights 
and its “counterterrorism” efforts in Xinjiang.150  
International ability to intervene is limited. China is not a 
party to UN International Criminal Law (“ICC”) which prosecutes 
crimes against humanity and China resides on the UN Security 
Council, meaning it holds veto power over referrals to the ICC.151  
In October of 2019, the United States imposed visa 
restrictions on Chinese officials who were believed to be 
responsible or complicit in the detention of Uighurs in Xinjiang.152 
The U.S. also blacklisted two dozen Chinese companies and 
agencies linked to abuses in the region blocking them from buying 
U.S. products.153 In 2020, President Donald Trump signed a policy 
sanctioning individuals, including Chen Quanguo, for human rights 
abuses against Uighurs.154 The law requires U.S. businesses and 
individuals selling products to or operating in Xinjiang to ensure 
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their activities do not contribute to human rights violations, 
including the use of forced labor.155 
U.S. policies preventing use of forced labor are also being 
expanded in the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, which 
passed in the U.S. House of Representatives on September 22, 
2020.156 If the bill becomes law, U.S. authorities would have more 
power to enforce the law.157 For example, public companies would 
be required to certify to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) that their products are not made using forced labor from 
Xinjiang.158 If companies are found to have used forced labor from 
the region, they could be prosecuted for security violations.159 It is      
estimated that more than 80,000 Uighurs have been transferred out 
of Xinjiang to work in factories across China between 2017 and 
2019, and some of them were sent directly from detention 
camps.160 Uighurs are thought to be working in factories that are in 
the supply chains of at least 82 well-known global brands in 
technology, clothing and automotive sectors including: Amazon, 
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L.L. Bean, Nintendo and BMW.161 Already, lobbyists for 
corporations like Nike and Apple are trying to weaken the law.162  
The location of Xinjiang is a critical link in China’s supply 
chain. Particularly for a new Chinese trade plan the Belt and Road 
Initiative. Launched in 2013 by President Xi Jinping, the initiative 
plans to construct a new overland route through Xinjiang as well as 
a maritime route through the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.163 
The Belt and Road Initiative (“BRI”) is a collection of 
development and investment projects stretching through Asia and 
Europe.164 If successful, the Plan would significantly expand 
China’s economic and political influence.165 It is estimated that 
China has already spent 60 billion dollars on the BRI and plans to 
build physical infrastructure and around fifty special economic 
zones.166 Some political science experts suggest the BRI is a large 
factor in the displacement and detainment of Uighurs.167  
Therefore, Sanctions would be more effective if other 
governments imposed similar restrictions on the CCP as well as 
companies utilizing forced Uighur labor.168 If the international 
community came together and universally imposed sanctions on 
China’s trade and trade initiatives, an industry China currently 
dominates and receives immense funding from, it would put 
pressure on China to stop the interment and human rights violation 
of Uighurs. While criticisms and indictments from global leaders 
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are a start, currently, no country is willing to stand against China 
and go further in their protection of Uighurs.169 At minimum, 
collectively imposing sanctions on companies, agencies, and 
individuals involved in the human rights abuse of Uighurs would 
send a powerful message. 
 
d. Crimes Against Humanity and Genocide 
Under international law and the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (“ICC”), China—at minimum—is 
committing crimes against humanity .170 Crimes against humanity 
are any of the following acts when committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian 
population: 
(1) Murder; (2) Enslavement; (3) Deportation or forcible 
transfer of population; (4) Imprisonment or deprivation of 
physical liberty; (5) Torture; (6) Rape, forced pregnancy, 
enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence; 
(7) Persecution against any identifiable group or 
collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, 
religious, gender, (8) Enforced disappearance of persons; 
(9) Other inhumane acts causing great suffering, or serious 
injury to body or mental or physical health.171 
Crimes against humanity can occur during peacetime.172 
Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute determines that crimes against 
humanity must be committed in furtherance of a State or 
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organizational policy to commit an attack.173 In contrast with 
genocide, crimes against humanity do not need to target a specific 
group.174 Instead, the victim of the attack can be any civilian 
population, regardless of its affiliation or identity.175 
Out of the ten possible crimes against humanity under the 
ICC, China is known to be perpetuating: imprisonment, forcible 
transfer of a population, persecution against a religious group, and 
enforced disappearances.176 Additionally, China has been accused 
of committing torture, sexual violence, forced labor (enslavement), 
and murder.177 Therefore,  the systematic persecution of Uighurs 
through large-scale detention programs, the abuse of detainees, 
enforced sterilization, and denial of information regarding the fate 
of persons in state custody all constitute crimes against humanity. 
Critically, as of writing this article, China’s governmental 
actions have progressed past crimes against humanity into 
genocide. Article II of the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide narrowly 
defines genocide to mean acts committed with the intent 
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, 
or religious group, including: (1) killing members of the 
group, (2) causing serious bodily or mental harm to 
members of the group, (3) deliberately inflicting 
conditions on the group calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part, (4) measures 
intended to prevent births within the group, and (5) 
forcibly transferring children of the group to another 
group.178 
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Under Article I, genocide can take place whether in armed 
conflict, internationally, or in peaceful situations. Additionally, 
Article I dictate that the contracting parties to the convention have 
an obligation to prevent and punish the crime of genocide.179  
The mens rea to commit genocide is proved on a case-by-
case basis through evidence demonstrating a consistent pattern of 
behavior established before the genocidal acts.180 These actions 
include political doctrine that gives rise to the acts, repetition of 
destructive and discriminator acts, and “deliberately and 
systematically targeting victims on account of their membership of 
a particular group while excluding the members of other 
groups.”181 
When the Uighur detainments are viewed within the 
historical context of China’s treatment of Muslim minorities, a 
consistent pattern of governmental behavior against Uighurs forms 
and intent to destroy or remove Uighurs may be inferred.182 
China’s political doctrines have directly given rise to the present 
treatment of Uighurs.183 China has effective state control of 
religious institutions with its national constitution giving citizens 
the freedom of “normal” religious practice, without defining what 
“normal” means.184 Leaving “normal” undefined allows China to 
stipulate common Muslim practices as illegal.185 These laws are 
specifically applied to the Xinjiang region and authorities have 
defined 26 religious activities as illegal, including wearing veils, 
homeschooling children, long beards, and praying in public.186 
Additionally, the “counter-terrorism” and “strike hard” campaigns 
have directly led to the genocidal acts of Chinese authorities.187 
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Intent is further illustrated by the destruction of mosques, forced 
labor of Uighurs, surveillance, and restriction on Uighur rights as 
well as the phrasing utilized to dehumanize Uighur people in 
official Chinese directives.188 Therefore, China has “the intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious 
group.”189 
The internment of Uighurs and their treatment by CCP 
fulfill the elements for acts of genocide under the UN 
Convention.190 Elements of genocide two through five largely 
occur within the “re-education” centers.191 Sexual violence, threats 
during interrogation, inhumane treatment, and torture all constitute 
serious bodily or mental harm.192 Uighurs who have experienced 
detainment described prison-like experiences, including being 
shackled to chairs for days, interrogations, sleep deprivation, and 
sexual abuse, like being forced to smear ground chile pepper 
mixture on their genitals.193 Additionally, mental harm has led to 
suicide and suicidal ideation.194 
Methods of group destruction do not need to immediately 
kill those persecuted. Instead, the perpetrator can seek their 
physical destruction by forced subsistence diet, systematic 
expulsion from homes, or the reduction of essential medical 
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services below the minimum requirement.195 It is likely the “re-
education” centers themselves are meant to inflict on Uighurs 
conditions of life calculated to bring about their destruction. 
Uighurs have reported being denied food or have been forced to 
eat pork and dog meat against their religion, sleep deprivation, and 
torture.196 Hygienic conditions have been described by escaped 
detainees as unsanitary.197 Cells are described as being 430 square 
feet and holding around 60 people.198 Each cell contains a single 
uncovered, unwalled, hole in the corner as a toilet for all detainees 
to use. 199 
Element four of genocide, imposing measures intended to 
prevent births within a group, include: the practice of sterilization, 
forced birth control, separation of the sexes, and prohibition of 
marriages.200 Recently, an Associated Press investigation found 
that China is subjecting thousands of Uighur women to pregnancy 
checks, forced intrauterine devices, sterilization, and abortions as 
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population control measures.201 Notably, the use of IUDs and 
sterilization has fallen nationwide but is rising sharply in 
Xinjiang.202  
Families with parents moved to “re-education centers” have 
their children forcibly removed and given to another ethno-religion 
group.203 More than 400 children have lost not just one but both 
parents to some form of internment, either in the camps or in 
prison.204 Over 100 children have disappeared, assumably into 
orphanages, while their parents were detained abroad or within 
Xinjiang. Parents have not been given information about their 
child’s location.205 Children who end up in foster care and 
orphanages are given a new Chinese name and placed with Han 
Chinese families.206 Other children are sent to boarding schools.207 
According to CCP planning documents the schools are designed to 
assimilate and indoctrinate children at an early age, away from the 
influence of their families.208 The schools are off limits to 
outsiders and heavily guarded.209 Chinese ambassador Liu 
Xiaoming has claimed that no separation of children is taking 
place: parents simply need to give the names of their children and 
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the government will locate them.210 However, the threat of being 
detained and the change in their children’s name makes this 
virtually impossible as the government tightly controls 
information.211   
Finally, element one—killing members of the group—is the 
most controversial as admitting to evidence of systematic killing 
would pressure the international community to act despite China’s 
economic power.212 Additionally, reports of deaths are tightly 
controlled by state media and the true number of Uighurs who 
have died in detainment is unknown.213  However, a prosecutor 
need only prove that “the perpetrator intentionally killed one or 
more members of the group, without the necessity of 
premeditation.”214 Although it is difficult to obtain accurate 
information about the deaths of Uighurs within the state's control, 
since 2014, over ten Uighurs have mysteriously “died in 
custody.”215 A former detainee described how the conditions 
within the “re-education” centers killed nine people within their 
cell.216 Additionally, the President of the Uyghur Projects 
Foundation and senior advisor to the World Uyghur Congress 
claims that the total number of Uighur detainees in China and 
those presumed dead now exceeds the total number of Jews 
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detained and killed during the Holocaust.217 A government official 
in Xinjiang has reported that where there was once a population of 
92,000 Uighur people in 2016, there remain only 20,000 people 
today.218 More than 80% of the Uighur population has disappeared 
in four years.219 Furthermore, China is enabling the potential mass 
death of Uighur people through detainment during a global 
pandemic.220 Imprisoned Uighurs have limited access to hospitals, 
nutrition, and quarantine areas.221 It is reasonably foreseeable that 
COVID-19 will spread rapidly and infect hundreds of vulnerable 
people.222 More than a dozen coronavirus cases have already been 
reported in Xinjiang, but it is unknown if anyone in detainment is 
infected.223  
Disturbingly, there is growing concern that detained 
Uighurs are being used as “kill-on-demand” emergency donors for 
Chinese Coronavirus patients.224 According to the Journal of 
Biomedical Research, China has one of the lowest organ donor 
rates in the world, with a voluntary donor rate of only one for 
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every two million citizens.225 Of the 1.5 million Chinese citizens 
who need an organ transplant donor each year, fewer than 10,000 
receive a successful match and organ, representing a supply-to-
demand ratio of 1 for every 150.226 Therefore, waiting times for a 
suitable donor take years however, recently COVID-19 patients 
have been supplied an organ in mere days.227 The China Tribunal 
concluded that because there was no evidence that the 
infrastructure associated with China’s transplantation industry had 
been dismantled, and  without a reasonable explanation as to the 
source of readily available organs, forced organ harvesting had 
taken place.228 Detainee reports include organ extractions on live 
victims, who are consequently killed by the procedures.229 
Further, China’s treatment of Uighurs should be considered 
cultural genocide. Although not formally recognized within 
international law, cultural genocide describes the systematic 
elimination of a group’s identity through measures such as: 
forcibly transferring children away from their families, restricting 
the use of a national language, banning cultural activities, 
destroying schools, religious institutions, or culturally important 
sites.230 Cultural genocide has long been discussed within the 
International Criminal Tribunal as well as during the drafting of 
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the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.231 
Typically, cultural genocide occurs simultaneously, or as a 
precursor to, mass violence, but does not necessitate it.  
In China and abroad, Uighurs are immersed in cultural 
genocide.232 Early on, Chinese officials  targeted academics, 
activists, and scholars as well as cultural figures.233 Among those 
who have disappeared into the camps are “Xinjiang University 
officials including its President, Professors, and former Vice 
Provost of Xinjiang Medical Institute, Uighur economist and writer 
Gilham Tohti, pop star Ablajan Ayup (who is thought to have been 
detained for singing about Uighur language education), football 
player Erfan Hezim,  a pro-footballer detained for “visiting foreign 
countries,” and a religious scholar, Muhammad Salih Hajim, who 
“died in custody.”234 
Chinese officials often accuse Uighur academics of being 
“two-faced” and insufficiently loyal to the state, or of having 
“nationalist tendencies.”235 Uighurs have practically every aspect 
of their lives restricted and monitored.236 There are bans on 
activities that had been ordinary parts of daily Uighur life – 
prayers, giving traditional greetings, and fasting.237 Uighurs can be 
jailed for refusing to drink alcohol or eat pork.238 Talking or 
gathering in groups is forbidden.239 Children in school are 
encouraged to report on any ‘disloyal’ talk by their parents or 
elders.240 Dozens of graveyards and religious sites have been 
destroyed and the Uighur language has been banned in Xinjiang 
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schools in favor of Mandarin Chinese.241 The use of Uighur 
writing, signs, and pictures is prohibited. Inter-ethnic marriages are 
actively promoted to slowly breed out “Uighurness”. 
Advertisements offer cash and other material inducements to Han 
men who take a Uighur bride.242 
As emphasized previously, within the detention centers 
Uighurs are subjected to political indoctrination, and torture when 
they fail to repeat laws and communist party dictum. Children have 
been forcibly removed from their parents stopping the passing of 
tradition and cultural identity.243 Through such actions China is 
systematically destroying the traditions, values, and language of 
the Uighurs. Therefore, the UN should formally recognize the 
treatment of Uighurs as cultural genocide and create a new tribunal 




Ultimately, if true, the above alleged facts indicate that the 
CCP may have perpetrated all five acts prohibited under Article II 
of the UN Genocide Convention. The Chinese government should 
immediately grant the UN Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights access to “re-education centers”, internal records, 
and detainees. 
Further the CCP must halt widespread violations and 
abuses of human rights, repeal the “Regulation on De-
extremification” policies, release all Muslims being arbitrarily 
detained in “re-education camps” and related facilities, end the 
enforced separation of Uighur children from their families, stop the 
practice of forcibly preventing births, and cease the deliberate 
destruction of the unique cultural heritage of the Uighur 
population.  
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Moreover, CCP authorities should stop pressuring the 
deportation of Uighur refugees, the surveillance and harassment of 
Uighurs abroad, and end financial benefits for companies using 
Uighur forced labor. If legal authorities choose not to deem 
China’s internment and treatment of Uighurs as a genocide, the 
international community should still find that China is committing 
crimes against humanity upon the Uighurs and use this opportunity 
to recognize and charge China with cultural genocide. At 
minimum, the international community should place collective 
sanctions against CCP authorities and trade with China while 
human rights abuses remain.  
 
 
 
